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Community policing presents its own distinct governance and accountability challenges. 
Local community police officers, for example, can find themselves stretched between the 
accountability demands of the local community and those flowing from professional, 
managerial and central government sources. Drawing on the results of a recent ethnographic 
study on neighbourhood police officers in rural and urban areas in the Netherlands, this 
article probes the nature and extent of these tensions and the coping strategies deployed by 
the officers in question and the police organisation as a whole. It finds that a regular strategy 
is to neutralise or marginalise the voice of the local community in shaping police priorities 
and strategies. Local democratic control of the police is often smothered by the competing 
professional, managerial, cultural and central government forces. This, in turn, has the effect 
of putting distance between police offices and citizens, and even creating a demand for the 
engagement of private sector patrol officers who are more responsive to the needs and wishes 





Governance and accountability are fundamental issues for the police in democratic societies. 
On the one hand, the police have the unique power to use coercion if needed. Police work 
may thus have far-reaching consequences for citizens, for good or ill. In this regard it is 
important to promote not only the economy and effectiveness of police work, but particularly 
its fairness, justice and legitimacy, and to monitor the extent to which these goals are attained. 
On the other hand, the police, both as an organization and at the level of individual officers, 
have considerable discretion [14].  Moreover, traditional police culture, with its emphasis on 
internal solidarity and suspicion of the outside world [27], is often assumed to hamper 
external control. This only serves to accentuate the relevance of issues such as how the police 
use their autonomy and how one can ensure they deliver important social and legal values. 
With the loss of traditional command-and-control over police work and the rise of more 
horizontal forms of governance during recent decades, police governance and accountability 
have become ever more important.  
 
These issues seem to have special relevance with regard to community policing. Although the 
meaning of this concept is not always clear [2, 5, 10, 19], a common aim in all forms of 
community policing is to bridge the distance between the police and citizens, to promote 
citizen participation, to provide the police with more information and, as a result, to promote 
the effectiveness of policing strategies [38]. Thanks to developments such as citizen 
oversight, it is often assumed that community policing also encourages local governance and 
accountability of the police [15, 29, 30]. A main argument underlying the initiation of the 
familiar Chicago community policing style, with its emphasis on citizen participation, was 
that it would enable citizens to provide local knowledge and resources to the police, and that 
they would be better able to ‘monitor police officers and hold them accountable’ [7].   
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However, community policing is not always seen as beneficial to police accountability. From 
a more hierarchical perspective, organizational decentralization, a growing intimacy between 
community police officers and citizens, and increased use of discretion by police officers, 
may be viewed as potential threats to accountability. According to Kelling, Wasserman and 
Williams [13; p.2] ‘advocates of community policing (-) should be extraordinarily scrupulous 
about ensuring that officers are held accountable for their actions.’ This more sceptical view 
of the accountability of community policing reappears from time to time. According to 
Brogden and Nijhar [2; pp.53-56] there is ‘a major problem of accountability with regard to 
community policing.’ In their view, community policing leads to the police becoming 
dependent on community participation and community consent. This is seen as a factor that 
might encourage the police to follow specific interests, which might in turn increase the risk 
of ‘discriminatory law enforcement.’ This view of the relation between community policing 
and accountability is also found in the recent work published by Herbert [9; p.85]. In his view, 
both cultural and organizational factors make it necessary ‘to adopt a sceptical attitude toward 
community policing as a vehicle for improved police accountability.’    
 
It is in the light of these diverging views that I deal here with the practices of governance and 
accountability of community policing. My special interest is in the diversity of and relations 
between various forms of governance and accountability of community policing. This paper is 
based on several empirical studies of community policing in the Netherlands [31, 32, 34]. 
Among them is an ethnographic study in which the daily work of community police officers 
was observed at six different police stations (in both urban and rural areas), for a few weeks at 
each station [34, 38]. 
 
In this paper I first deal with the concepts of police governance and accountability. I then 
present an overview of police governance/accountability in the Netherlands and community 
policing in the Netherlands. Thereafter I go on to describe the practices of governance and 
accountability of community policing in the Netherlands, where I draw a distinction between 
local and non-local forms of governance and accountability. My conclusions concentrate on 
the tensions between different forms of governance and accountability and the unintended 
consequences that may result. 
 
 
2. Police governance and accountability 
 
It has often been noted that governance and accountability are multifaceted, multi-
dimensional concepts [15, 26, 41, 44]. They both refer to the two distinguishable, but 
interconnected levels of the police organization and the conduct of individual police officers.  
Different types of governance and accountability may involve a variety of relations and may 
be based on different channels, methods, means and discourses. In light of this, several 
distinctions may be drawn between various types of governance and accountability: internal 
and external, local and centralized, vertical and horizontal, upwards and downwards [30, 44]. 
Moreover, different types of police governance and accountability may be based on various 
(combinations of) values, such as the equal treatment of citizens, quality of service, justice, 
effectiveness and efficiency, democratic legitimacy or (procedural) legality. It may be 
assumed in general that the shift from government to governance resulted not only in new 
forms of governance and accountability, but also in more complex, often hybrid 
combinations, and in this respect the police are no exception. As Chan [3] showed in her 
study of the Australian police, the new forms of police accountability, based on the New 
Public Management, often did not replace the older legal and disciplinary forms, despite the 
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fact that they were based on very different assumptions. In fact, the introduction of 
managerial and risk management-based forms of accountability resulted in extremely 
different forms of governance and accountability just piling up, one on the other. 
 
It can be expected that similar processes may have happened among street-level workers, such 
as community police officers. According to Hupe and Hill [12], changes in the working 
environment of street-level workers since the 1980s, such as increasing cooperation with 
partner agencies and closer relations with active citizens, now mean that these workers often 
operate in 'multidimensional networks', which implies that such officers are not solely 
oriented along traditional, top-down lines of authority and control. As a result, multiple forms 
of governance and accountability are to be found in street-level work, including public-
administrative, professional and participatory forms. This was confirmed in a recent study by 
Somerville [30], who showed that community police officers are not only held accountable 
within the hierarchy, but also horizontally and 'vertically downwards'. Each of these forms 
involves different actors (superiors, colleagues and the public).   
 
The Cultural Theory of Douglas [6], as applied by Hood [11] to the management of public 
organizations, may be useful in helping us understand the diversity of governance and 
accountability and the consequences this may have. Various forms of governance and 
accountability may be understood as reflecting different underlying cultures: fatalist, 
hierarchical, individualist and egalitarian (see table 1). These cultures are viewed as 
fundamental because they cannot be reduced, one to the other. Each culture stresses its own 
specific values, is based on a certain diagnosis of the police organization and on certain 
remedies for the prevailing problems. However, each culture of governance/accountability 
also has its own specific or in-built failures and vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 1. Four cultures of governance and accountability of public organizations; Hood [11] 
Fatalist 
Stress on unpredictability; minimal anticipation of 
future problems, at most ad hoc responses; no trust in 
goal-oriented policies; let things take their own course 
is the dominating attitude. 
Hierarchist 
Problems are attributed to poor compliance with rules 
and procedures; remedy is more, strict procedures and 
rules, better coordination, more control and more 
‘grip’ by the authorities at the top.  
Individualist 
Many problems are seen as a result of a surplus of 
collective organization; solution consists of market-
like mechanisms and competition, creating incentives 
to influence individual behaviour.  
Egalitarian 
Too much stress on hierarchical rules and procedures 
is seen as main cause of problems. Remedy consists of 
creating more room for ‘participation’ in decision- 
making and in co-production of ‘equal’ members.  
 
This theory may be useful in helping us understand the combination of very diverse forms of 
governance and accountability in community policing. The four cultures may be seen as 
reactions to each other. Each culture may be viewed as an endeavour to compensate for the 
one-sidedness and failures of one or more of the other cultures. The hierarchical, individualist 
and egalitarian cultures of governance and accountability can be seen as three different ways 
to find an answer to the more fatalist culture that often dominates traditional police culture at 
street-level, which promotes a pessimistic view and an unwillingness to steer police work and 
provide accountability. These cultures may be seen as reactions to each other in other 
respects, too. Egalitarian culture puts more trust in the participation of lower-level members. 
It is a reaction to hierarchical cultures, which try to minimize autonomy by strict rules and 
procedures. Individualist cultures of governance and accountability introduce market-like 
incentives to bring an end to the red tape and lack of goal-orientation often associated with 
both hierarchical and egalitarian cultures.    
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Before analyzing the governance and accountability of community policing in the 
Netherlands, I must first look at the organization, governance and accountability of the Dutch 
police, before going on to briefly describe the position of community policing in the country.   
 
 
3. Police governance and accountability in the Netherlands 
 
The police organization in the Netherlands is traditionally locally based, although national 
police forces have also existed for quite a long time. Until 1993 all municipalities with more 
than 25,000 inhabitants had their own police force. In that year, under the new Police Act, the 
148 municipal police forces were replaced by 25 (quasi-autonomous) regional police 
organizations. In addition there is a national police force, which performs specialized tasks. 
Regional police forces in the Netherlands have a rather complex structure of governance and 
accountability, partly resulting from the fact that the regional forces have to cooperate with 
many municipalities (on average about 20), each with its own local government. 
The Police Act distinguishes between two forms of police governance: the authority over the 
police and the administration of the police. Each form of governance relates to different 
issues and lies within the formal power of different actors.  
 
The authority over the police involves the power to make decisions about actual police work, 
which implies decisions about police priorities, the use of police powers and the exercise of 
police work in a more general sense. The Police Act distinguishes two forms of authority over 
the police. In relation to the enforcement of public order (including service tasks), the 
authority lies with the mayor. The public prosecutor has authority over the police in regard to 
the enforcement of criminal law. Because the enforcement of public order and criminal law 
are closely related, there is a need for regular consultation between the actors responsible for 
them. This is organized in what is called a local triangle, participated in by the mayor, the 
public prosecutor, and the local police chief. 
 
The administration of the police involves the power to make decisions about the force’s 
organization and resources. The ‘force administrator’, usually the mayor of the largest 
municipality in the region, has this formal power. There is a need for consultation at the 
regional level too. In the regional triangle the force administrator frequently meets with the 
regional public prosecutor and the regional police chief to consult on matters related to the 
administration of the force. In addition to the authority over and administration of the police, 
there is a third dimension, namely the policy of the police. At the regional level, policy is 
entrusted to a Regional Board consisting of the regional public prosecutor, the regional police 
chief and the mayors of all municipalities in the region. 
 
One of the main arguments underlying this complex system of governance and accountability 
is that it creates checks and balances in the powers over the police, both between the mayor 
and the public prosecution, and between the local and regional level. In practice, the formal 
concepts of authority, administration and policy over the police do not offer the full picture. A 
true understanding of police governance and accountability in practice requires an 
understanding of the role of informal relations between the main actors. [32]. 
 
One of the main problems with the accountability of the Dutch police is the so-called 
‘democratic deficit’. All the actors involved in the governance and accountability of the 
regional police, including the mayor, are unelected officials. The elected municipal councils 
only have the right to be informed by their mayor about decisions made in the Regional Board 
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and to offer advice about the annual policy plan. In practice this democratic control is rather 
poor [18, 32]. The distance between the local municipal council and the police (especially at 
the regional level) is often too great. Members of the council often lack expertise about the 
police.  
 
In 1993 the new Police Act created a relatively decentralized police structure. Since then, 
there has been a gradual process of centralization, especially in respect of governance and 
accountability. In the late 1990s the government introduced a new, centralized procedure for 
police planning. The new top-down procedure defined national priorities to which the police 
were expected to conform, both at the local and regional levels. It was a prelude to a more far-
reaching system of performance management, introduced in 2003 under the influence of the 
New Public Management (NPM). This system contains targets and performance indicators 
which the regional police forces have to achieve. A revised system of performance 
management was introduced in 2007 [39, 42]. Compared with its predecessor, less emphasis 
was put on strict, quantitative performance indicators. However, this did not change the 
gradual centralization of the police. On the contrary, the debate about the replacement of 
regional forces by a single national police force is still going on. One cannot exclude the 
possibility that within a couple of years the government will decide that the Netherlands shall 
have one national police force.   
 
 
4. Community policing in the Netherlands 
 
In the Netherlands the first initiatives on community policing were taken in the 1970s, but it 
was in the early 1990s before community policing became a dominant police model [25]. At 
that time the institutionalization of community policing was to a large degree a reaction to the 
increase in scale of police work resulting from the introduction of the new Police Act in 1993. 
Community policing in the Netherlands, with its stress on decentralization, a focus on small 
geographical areas and the goal of proximity [40], was a strategy to avoid a growing distance 
between the police on the one hand and citizens and local government on the other.  
 
At the time of writing all regional police forces in the Netherlands apply the community 
policing model, in one way or another. The Dutch variant of community policing focuses on 
five central ambitions: reducing the distance between the police and citizens, an orientation to 
a broad range of problems in the neighbourhood, an emphasis on preventive as well as 
reactive policing, cooperation with other agencies, and the encouragement of citizen 
involvement. A recent study shows that these ambitions have only partially been achieved. 
Moreover, there are important differences in the organization and implementation of 
community policing, both between and in regional police forces. In many cases community 
policing is a relatively isolated job done by individual police officers. In other cases it is the 
task of a neighbourhood team, some of which undertake crime investigation and/or police 
patrols, while in other cases they only perform specific ‘community policing activities’ [34]. 
  
The Dutch interpretation of community policing is pragmatic, as illustrated by its adoption of 
the concept of 'area-bound policing'. In contrast with the United States, for example, where 
according to Herbert [8; pp.16 and 29-30] community policing is largely based on 
romanticized notions of community and long-treasured ideals of local democracy, the 
Netherlands’ focus on ‘community’ or neighbourhood  is essentially a functional strategy to 
reduce the distance between citizens and police. It offers a preferred scale or level at which to 
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organize a considerable part of the police work in close cooperation with other agencies at 
that level. 
 
Although community policing is still a dominant paradigm in the Dutch police, support for the 
model has become more ambivalent during the last decade or so. There seems to be an 
alternation between support for and criticism of the model, both in and outside the police 
organization. The erosion of community policing as a dominant mainstream model is the 
result of several factors, including the new managerial stress on the ‘core business’ of the 
police [39] and the shift to a more repressive, punitive policy climate in the Netherlands [20, 
21]. According to some commentators this may imply a radical break in the development of 
community policing in the Netherlands, resulting in the model losing its position. It has even 
been suggested that the Dutch police, 'with a sigh of relief' can now revert to 'doing "real" 
police work' [24; p.75]. 
 
On the other hand, this assessment is not confirmed by the outcomes of a recent study of 
community policing in the Netherlands [34, 38]. Admittedly, it shows the new 
managerialization of the police and changes in the political climate have had an impact on the 
daily work of community police officers. However, the suggestion that community policing is 
now defunct and that the police have returned to 'real police work' (whatever that may mean) 
is difficult to reconcile with the practices of 2635 of community police officers in the 
Netherlands [17] and the fact that many of the aims of the community policing model are still 
alive at street-level and form part of the officers’ daily work, albeit with many shortcomings 
and limitations.  
 
 
5. Governance and accountability in community policing: non-local forms 
Governance and accountability in community policing in the Netherlands come in several 
forms, both local and non-local. Some of the non-local forms originally focused more on the 
organization as a whole than on individual police officers, but they also impact on the latter 
[16; pp.172-196]. This complexity results from the fact that a multiplicity of actors have a 
stake in the implementation of community policing, and the community police officers often 
are more or less, directly or indirectly, dependent on them. These actors may have different 
views about the actual and desirable work of community police officers. They may follow 
different presumptions and values and (in line with this) have different notions about the 
control and accountability of community policing. 
 
It is useful to distinguish here between two non-local and four local forms of governance and 
accountability. Bureaucratic and managerial forms are mainly non-local (or perhaps, more 
accurately, non-locally initiated). In terms of Cultural Theory, they should be considered 
hierarchical and individualist respectively. The local forms differ with regard to the main 
actor. They are related to the local government/politics, other police professionals, local 
partnerships and (groups of) citizens. The first one might be considered hierarchical. The 
other three are more egalitarian, although they also have elements of other cultures (especially 
the hierarchical one). How each of these forms of governance and accountability operates is 
described briefly in the following sections. 
 
Bureaucratism  
To outsiders the police organization may look like a strictly organized bureaucracy where the 
work of officers is precisely regulated with stringent formal or legal rules and control. 
Although there are differences in the degree to which the police are strictly organized and 
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controlled, the practice of police work in the Netherlands often differs from its formal 
perception. This is particularly the case with community policing. 
 
In the view of many senior officers, before 1993 (the year when the new Police Act was 
introduced and the police were radically reorganized) the traditional organization still 
dominated, with its strict orders and control. Police officers daily received precise orders from 
their superiors. Moreover, there were strict forms of scheduling, which largely determined 
their work activities. This combination of command-and-control and capacity management 
was embedded in often rather small, easy-to-oversee organizations, dominated by direct 
personal relations between superiors and officers of lower rank.  
 
The 1993 reorganization introduced a drastic enlargement of the police organization’s scale. 
Many officers were transferred to other positions. As a result many of the direct, personal 
relations between higher ranks and street-level officers disappeared. The system of command-
and-control soon eroded. As a consequence, many police officers noticed that they had more 
autonomy and were more independent in their work. Many, however, felt as if they were 
being left to their own devices.  
 
Since the late 1990s the Dutch central government has aimed to reduce the autonomy of the 
police. Initially the government introduced central policy planning. This approach contained a 
list of national priorities that the police forces should follow. A complex annual auditing 
procedure was introduced to check on the forces’ achievement of these priorities. 
Community police officers were also expected to conform to this arrangement. They were to 
translate the prescribed priorities to the situation in their own neighbourhood. Although 
community police officers partially conformed (albeit often rather ritualistically), it had 
relatively little impact on their considerable autonomy. Despite the introduction of all kinds of 
measures to direct their work (such as neighbourhood scans, neighbourhood safety plans and 
internal briefings), community police officers work on the ground was still largely shaped by 
the seemingly endless flow of incidents and issues that confront them on a daily basis in 
practice, from both within and outside their organization. How community police officers 
respond to these demands depends mainly on their own view and initiative. Formal rules or 
orders from higher levels in the organization have hardly any impact. 
 
New managerialism 
Within as little as two years after the introduction of the central planning system, the 
government decided that it had failed to meet its expectations. An evaluation compared the 
system and its annual audit procedure to a ritual rain dance [43]. The government therefore 
decided to introduce a more radical system of performance management. This illustrated the 
growing influence of NPM discourse and methods within the Dutch police since the mid 
1990s [39]. The new system of performance management introduced quantitative targets 
(with process, output and outcome indicators) that the police forces should attain. If a force 
did not meet its targets, this could mean it would not receive a (limited) financial bonus [42]. 
However, the loss of reputation, both of the force and its management, was probably felt to be 
a more serious sanction.  
 
A detailed study of the daily implementation of community policing [34, 38] showed that this 
new system of governance and accountability had more impact on police work, although not 
always in the ways intended. Many of the police forces had translated the system internally 
into individual targets for police officers. The target of an annually fixed number of required 
fines proved to be a particularly contentious issue. Community police officers differ in their 
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views about the system. Some of them think that it has only a limited impact on their own 
work. These officers are not really concerned about the consequences of the system. Some of 
them even evaluate it positively – not for themselves, but because of the impact it may have 
on some of their colleagues who in their view fail to meet their targets due to a lack of 
commitment. However, even community police officers with a modestly positive view of the 
system have expressed the fear that the government would raise their production targets over 
time, which in their view would present negative consequences for their work.1  
 
Overall, the majority of the community police officers proved to be rather critical of the 
performance management system. In their view a fixed target of fines does not fit in with how 
community policing should operate. They felt they were forced to use strategies and means 
that they felt were not always appropriate. In their view the introduction of this system 
showed that the government and the police managers actually did not understand the kind of 
work they were doing.  
 
The observational study of community police officers also revealed that the performance 
management system could have some unintended, negative effects on police work. 
 
One of the neighbourhood teams that was studied runs the risk of not realizing its targets of a fixed 
number of fines for environmental offences. With still a couple of weeks to go until the end of the year, 
the team management decided that the team members (among them the community police officers) had 
to produce artificially (more) 'environmental fines.' All citizens who were fishing near one of the ponds 
or ditches in the neighbourhood would systematically be controlled by the police. Those who did not 
have a fishing permission with them would get a fine. These fines were (re)defined as fines for 
environmental delinquency in order to realize the production target. Members of the neighbourhood 
team conformed to this strategy, but were offstage highly cynical about it. 
 
This (together with several other examples) shows that performance management became to a 
significant extent an end in itself. This is all the more paradoxical because the system, derived 
from the private business sector, was meant to promote goal-orientation, effectiveness and 
efficiency in public sectors like the police [4, 22]. In 2007, after much discussion and a lot of 
criticism, the government decided to revise the system to base it less one-sidedly on 
quantitative targets and performance indicators. However, the underlying logic remained 
unchanged. Moreover, despite the change in government policy, many police forces internally 
retained the system of fixed production targets and strict control of lower-rank officers.    
 
 
6. Governance and accountability of community policing: local forms 
  
In addition to non-locally initiated forms of police governance and accountability there are 
also several local forms which are of particular relevance to community policing. These form 
part of the relations between the police and local government, partner agencies and citizens. 
The latter two are relatively new and relate to important changes in public security over 
approximately the past 15 years and the changing position of the police in an increasingly 
'multilateralized' field [1].  
 
Local administrative and political governance/accountability 
                                               
Professor of Criminology at the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
1As mentioned before: the government did not raise these standards. The system of performance management 
was revised in 2007. More emphasis was put on qualitative rather than quantitative standards.   
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Three elements of local government are relevant to police governance and accountability: the 
position of the mayor as the official with (partial) authority over the police; the position of the 
municipal council; and the new position of local government in the so-called local integrated 
public safety policy. 
 
First, the mayor has the legal authority to decide on local police priorities and general 
strategies in regard to the enforcement of public order. However, the relationship between the 
mayor and the local police is often more complex than this might suggest. Although public 
order authority formally vests with the mayor, in practice he or she is dependent on other, 
non-local officials who have authority over criminal law enforcement and police 
administration. This implies that, while the mayor may decide on certain police priorities, he 
or she does not have the power to decide on the police personnel and resources that may be 
needed.2 
 
There may be another complicating factor in small and medium-sized municipalities. 
Although the local police chief is accountable to the mayor in respect of public order 
enforcement, in practice this may conflict with the need to manage internal relations with his 
or her police bosses, who work elsewhere in the region. At a higher level within the police 
organization there may be other priorities than those set by the mayor. As a result, a local 
police chief (in small municipalities a community police officer) is often caught between at 
least two stools: the mayor, and his or her own, internal police superior. One of the strategies 
that local police officers (chiefs or community police officers) use in response, is to avoid 
strict accountability to the mayor. 
 
Another strategy is to keep relations with the mayor very informal [32]. Since the mayor (or 
the municipality in general) often depends on the police’s expertise, information and 
resources, he or she will often find it difficult to govern and control the police.  
Mayors often feel they are dependent on community police officers for information about 
social tensions, social disorder and (potential) social and political unrest within their 
community. Accordingly, some of them, especially those in medium-sized municipalities, will 
want to have regular, direct relations with ‘their’ community police officers. This may entail 
regular meetings (bi-monthly, for example). In this informal way they get more information 
and are better able to steer the police work in the neighbourhoods. Using this strategy means 
they bypass the obstacles in the formal, hierarchical line, with its many layers and interests.    
 
The second element concerns the democratic influence on and control of the local police. In 
the Netherlands the elected municipal council has very few powers over the police. The 
council only has a right to request the mayor for information about decisions made in the 
Regional Board, which they are allowed to discuss. For members of a municipal council it 
may be difficult to participate in debates on the police and to influence the police agenda 
because they often lack the necessary information and expertise. Moreover, the municipal 
council has no influence on matters of authority or administration over the police. It is left to 
the willingness of the mayor to follow any advice offered by council members. In the 
Netherlands the police have no formal obligation of accountability to the elected municipal 
council. Nevertheless, local police chiefs often attend meetings of the council or one of its 
committees. Even if there is no formal demand of accountability, police chiefs think it is 
important to have good relations with local politicians. This does not detract form the fact 
                                               
2
 With the exception of the mayor of large municipalities, who may have authority over the local police and can 
be the regional police force administrator. 
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that, both formally and in practice, the municipal councils do not have a genuine influence on 
the local police and are barely able to exercise any democratic control on the police [18]. 
 
Thirdly, the rise of the integrated public safety policy in the Netherlands over the past 15 
years has had enormous consequences for the position of local government. Until the mid-
1980s issues of crime and disorder were virtually absent from the local government agenda. 
Today, local government has a central position in local security policies and arrangements. 
There is a general consensus that local government should coordinate local security. This 
implies that officials working in many sectors and departments of the local administration 
participate in a very wide range of local initiatives and local security networks [36].This also 
has consequences for the relations between local government and the local police. Here they 
are partner agencies, cooperating in a more or less horizontal relationship. The coordination of 
these networks by local government is a form of governance among 'equals', often depending 
on negotiations, the power of persuasion and a search for consensus. These complex, informal 
networks often lack transparency and accountability, both externally and internally [36]. 
 
Professional governance/accountability 
Although community police officers work in a given organizational context, under different 
forms of governance and control, and have to cooperate with several groups of actors trying to 
influence their work, they still have considerable autonomy. The priorities in their work, the 
issues they pay attention to and their work style result largely from their own decisions (even 
though these are not always made reflexively). Community police officers have what Prottas 
[23] calls a 'boundary-spanning role', which means that, although they are members of the 
police organization, they often operate on their own outside the police station, have their own 
agenda, maintain contacts with citizens and agencies that no colleague is aware of, work for 
the most part without direct supervision and have a surplus of information about relevant 
situations and problems in the neighborhood.  This makes it difficult for their superiors to 
control them. 
 
For community police officers, the considerable autonomy they have is one of the most 
attractive elements of their job. It gives them the room to do their work in a way they prefer, 
to take their own responsibility and to show their commitment and ability in finding solutions 
to problematic situations in their neighbourhood. This also implies that they expect that their 
superiors leave them some autonomy. It does not follow, however, that they do not welcome 
some levels of input from their superior officers. Although community police officers attach 
great value to their autonomy, they still expect their superiors to support them in their work, 
to operate as a source of information and to help them in case of trouble, especially if 
emotional distress is involved. They expect a form of guidance when they are faced with 
complex tasks. These forms of support and guidance (one might also call it coaching) are not 
hierarchical, but are delivered by one professional to another (even if the other professional is 
their superior). These forms of support presuppose and value the autonomy of the community 
police officer. 
 
In the view of many community police officers in the Netherlands there is a lack of 
professional support in their work. This is one of the factors contributing to tensions in the 
relations between community police officers and higher ranking officers, including their 
direct chief. In the past, professional forms of police governance and accountability were 
presented as potential alternatives to a command-and-control culture in police organizations. 
It is a form of self-regulation by professionals based on self-imposed rules, values and 
procedures [13]. However, this ideal of a professional police culture of governance and 
 10
accountability is seldom realized in practice. One of the consequences is that no professional 
police tradition was available to provide an adequate response to the new managerial 
discourse and instruments that have come to dominate the Dutch police for more than a 
decade. The main thrust of the new managerial discourse is to impose limitations on the 
autonomy and power of professionals in the public sector. In this atmosphere, and with a poor 
professional tradition within the police, professional governance and accountability remain 
marginal. 
 
Governance and accountability in partnerships 
Since the 1990s the Dutch police have increasingly been participating in all kinds of local 
security networks. These networks provide more or less holistic strategies for controlling 
problems of crime and disorder, such as those in neighbourhoods, shopping malls, business 
parks, public transport or recreational areas. The participants in such networks include the 
police, local government (often represented by various departments), organizations for 
welfare, youth work, social services, schools, business associations and citizens. In these 
networks the police are often represented by a community police officer [33, 34]. 
 
The participation of the police in these networks may have consequences for police 
governance and accountability, especially for community policing. In these networks partners 
make agreements about common procedures, the exchange of information and the 
coordination of activities. Although there may be formal agreements (even contracts) between 
partner agencies, in practice such networks often depend on informal agreements and personal 
relations. 
 
In many networks, local government (or one of its departments) is expected to be the 
coordinator and to control whether partner agencies are conforming to the agreements made. 
In practice, coordination by local governments is often rather poor. Many factors contribute to 
this, such as a lack of resources, a shortage of expertise and a culture that is often more 
focused on policy processes than the practical work done in these networks. This is one of the 
reasons why the police (especially the community police officer) with its surplus of 
information and expertise, often gradually take over this coordination task. Moreover, these 
forms of governance and accountability are difficult to implement because relations between 
the members of these networks are horizontal and more or less egalitarian. There are no 
hierarchical relations even between the coordinator (local government) and the network’s 
members, which means that governance is not a matter of command but, even in case of 
formal agreements, a question of negotiation, persuasion and consultation – processes which 
often take time. It is often hard to say whether they are effective in influencing the police. 
Roughly the same applies to the control of the activities of the network participants. Not only 
are the members independent and their participation often voluntary; there may also be 
organizational interests dissuading members from providing information about their 
performance. Accountability of the police in such a network is therefore often voluntary and 
limited. If one of the participating organizations (including the police) does not want to offer 
accountability for its work, the other participants may be dissatisfied but may not be able to 
force the matter. 
 
Community police officers who are willing to cooperate with other agencies, ready to adapt 
their activities to those of their partners and to be open about their work, may be constrained 
by a dependency on their superiors, who often differ in their view of the participation of the 
police in the network. They may have their reservations about participation in such networks, 
fearing it will produce a greater workload for the police and perhaps divert them from their 
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'core business’ tasks. The result is that community police officers may be in a conflicted 
position between external partners and internal superiors. Although local security networks 
contribute to policing and public security, they have only a limited impact on police 
governance and accountability.  
 
Local participatory governance and accountability 
A central aim of community policing is to promote citizen involvement in the management of 
crime and disorder in the neighbourhood. One of the strategies to achieve this is by citizen 
participation in deliberations with the police. A well-known example of this is the beat 
meetings in Chicago. Such deliberations may be used to present citizens’ views on problems 
in the neighbourhood, as well as their priorities for police work. The meetings may also be 
used to promote police accountability directly to citizens [7, 29]. 
 
Local forms of direct and participatory police governance and accountability are often 
presented as alternatives to hierarchical and professional forms that, albeit in different ways, 
tend to exclude citizens from direct inspection and control of the police [14, 26]. Local forms 
of police governance and accountability may also be seen as correctives to the creeping 
centralization of the Dutch police, partly a result of the dominance of NPM-based policies, 
such as performance management. 
 
Many of the community police officers in the Netherlands have regular meetings with 
residents. The functions, structure and frequency of these meetings may differ. As a rule, 
community police officers have rather negative views about such meetings, believing that 
such deliberations are not ‘productive’. Moreover, citizens who attend the meetings are seen 
as unrepresentative of the whole community, often being viewed as ‘loudmouths’, more 
interested in their own interests or ‘making trouble’. Citizens attending these meetings are 
often described as having ‘unrealistic’ demands and as ‘chronic complainers’ [28, 37]. As a 
result, many community police officers perceive these meetings as a boring and irritating task.  
 
During these meetings community police officers have to deal with two potential tensions. 
First, they may be confronted with demands by citizens that the police are not able or ready to 
meet. On the one hand they should not commit themselves too readily to these demands. On 
the other, they should avoid citizens feeling insulted by their refusal. Community police 
officers use several strategies to achieve this: by explaining the ‘difficult position’ of the 
police, minimizing the seriousness of the problems, redefining citizens’ demands (so that it is 
no longer seen as a police task) or by referring citizens to another agency. None of these 
strategies is without risk: citizens may perceive this as an indication that the police are not 
really interested in their problems or that they are more motivated by police self-interest. 
 
Secondly, during these meetings community police officers are often confronted with all 
kinds of citizen discomfort and uneasiness. In many cases these feelings do not relate to 
police issues in the narrow sense, but more to general economic or social conditions about 
which the citizens feel uneasy (such as radical changes in the neighbourhood population). 
Nevertheless, this discomfort is often focused on the police. As a result community police 
officers feel that they become scapegoats for problems that have nothing to do with them. 
 
Despite these drawbacks, most community police officers carry on attending these meetings. 
Partly this is thanks to their loyalty and sense of duty. Even more important is that such 
meetings provide them with information about (new) problems and risks in the 
neighbourhood. In fact, community police officers often imperceptibly redefine the main 
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function of these meetings with citizens, going from a deliberation about police priorities and 
control to a one-sided, police-centered provision of information. This may also explain the 
irritation about the meetings, both among police officers and citizens. Often without their 
being aware of it, police officers and citizens may have divergent expectations about the 
meetings: as only a source of information or as a ‘real’ say in police matters. Whereas 
deliberating citizens may be viewed by police officers as ‘soreheads’ or ‘troublemakers’, 
community police officers may be perceived by citizens as unresponsive. The two complaints 
are complementary. 
 
This analysis shows that in practice local and direct forms of police governance and 
accountability are scarcely ever realized. This corresponds with the conclusions of Herbert [9] 
in his study conducted in Seattle. However, in contrast to his conclusions, the present study 
shows that the poor level of local governance and accountability is not the result of a police 
culture that emphasizes police self-protection. The neutralization of citizen input and control 
may better be seen as the outcome of police officers’ strategies to reconcile conflicting 
demands and expectations from citizens and from their organization. The result is a 
minimization of influence and control of citizens on the police. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks    
 
For the past 15 years or so the forms of governance and accountability of community policing 
have been multiplying. New forms were introduced, often as a result of the eroding legitimacy 
and power of older ones and because new actors succeeded in getting their views and interests 
on the police agenda. However, these new models did not replace the old ones; rather they 
were ‘grafted on top of it’ [3; p.262]. It is often assumed that hybrid public organizations 
require hybrid forms of accountability (and, one may add, governance). This analysis 
certainly makes sense. Various forms of governance and accountability, based on different 
cultures, have their own logic, but also their specific failures. Failures may be compensated by 
changing the permutations. However, this still leaves open the question of how the various 
types of governance and accountability relate [26]. 
 
Piling up different forms of governance and accountability, each with different underlying 
assumptions and logics, creates a complexity that is difficult to see through. Moreover, as the 
preceding analysis has shown, hardly any of these forms of governance/accountability of 
community policing in the Netherlands meets its standards. The traditional culture of 
command-and-control is hard to align with the complexity of community policing, the need 
for a flexible, tailor-made approach and the need for officer discretion. The new managerial 
forms of governance and accountability (particularly performance management) do not fit 
with the localized nature of this work. This creates unintended consequences that are difficult 
to combine with community policing, such as creeping centralization and standardization. 
This conclusion also applies to local forms of governance and accountability. In the 
Netherlands, governance and control of the police by local government and the elected 
municipal council are both rather poor, as a result of various factors, like the tension between 
regional and local interests, the complexity of the formal governance structure of the police 
and the shortage of formal powers and expertise of members of the municipal council.  
Professional forms of governance and accountability are often presented as a solution to the 
failures associated with hierarchical and individualist governance/accountability. However, 
these professional forms are barely implemented in practice, despite the fact that this is what 
many community police officers would prefer and expect. 
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For the past 15 years, there has been a growing interest in citizen participation with regard to 
policing and public safety. The foregoing analysis has shown that citizen participation 
scarcely contributes to local participatory forms of police governance/accountability. 
Influence and control of the police by partners and citizens may be perceived as conflicting 
with the views, routines and priorities of the police themselves. The failure of local 
participatory forms of police governance and accountability in the Netherlands seems to 
correspond with experience in the United States, where Herbert [8] analyzed this failure as a 
consequence of lofty and unrealistic expectations about ‘community’ and local democracy. 
However, similar results were found in the Netherlands, even with its much more modest and 
pragmatic expectations about the meaning of the word ‘community’ in community policing 
and the relation between community policing and local democracy. 
 
The complexity of the governance and accountability of community policing is a more 
pressing issue due to the conflicting underlying cultures. Hierarchical cultures demand more 
rules, procedures, control and a unitary form of command. Individual and egalitarian forms 
expect more benefit from combinations of low-level democratic control, professional self-
regulation and police officer discretion. The relations between the different forms of 
governance and accountability are often unclear. In many respects they counteract each other.  
There are at least two responses to this complexity and lack of clarity, which exist side by 
side. First, the way the problems and tensions resulting from the multiple nature of police 
governance/accountability are handled is to a large degree left to the discretion of individual 
community police officers. The extent of citizen input and control depends very much on the 
ways individual officers manage the resulting tensions. Secondly, in many respects the 
traditional, central forms of governance and accountability have greater weight than the 
recently developed local ones. This results in part from the fact that the resources on which 
local police officers depend are more related to bureaucratic and managerial forms of 
governance and accountability. Moreover, the local forms are often quite informal, depending 
on personal commitment and the initiatives of individual police officers. This is often a poor 
basis for local governance and accountability in community policing. 
 
The imbalance between non-local and local governance/accountability has far-reaching 
consequences. Local democratic control of the police, both by the elected municipal council 
and by more informal, direct deliberative forms, often operates inadequately. Local 
governments, especially of small or medium-sized municipalities, often find that they are 
unable to exert much influence on the police. They notice that a higher level decides that the 
police should pay less attention to the problems in their communities. To compensate for this, 
an increasing number of local governments have established their own forms of municipal 
police, financed by their own resources and with fewer formal powers. The lack of local 
police governance and accountability also means that affluent local citizens are increasingly 
starting up their own forms of private security, such as residential patrols, for example [35]. In 
summary, in contrast to the original intentions of community policing, the imbalance between 
local and non-local forms of police governance/accountability seems to result in a growing 
distance between the police and local government, municipal council and citizens.     
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